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We build a very simple model of leveraged asset purchases with margin calls. Investment funds
use what is perhaps the most basic financial strategy, called “value investing”, i.e. systematically
attempting to buy underpriced assets. When funds do not borrow, the price fluctuations of the
asset are normally distributed and uncorrelated across time. All this changes when the funds are
allowed to leverage, i.e. borrow from a bank, to purchase more assets than their wealth would
otherwise permit. When funds use leverage, price fluctuations become heavy tailed and display
clustered volatility, similar to what is observed in real markets. Previous explanations of fat tails
and clustered volatility depended on “irrational behavior”, such as trend following. We show that
the immediate cause of the increase in extreme risks in our model is the risk control policy of
the banks: A prudent bank makes itself locally safer by putting a limit to leverage, so when a
fund exceeds its leverage limit, it must partially repay its loan by selling the asset. Unfortunately
this sometimes happens to all the funds simultaneously when the price is already falling. The
resulting nonlinear feedback amplifies downward price movements. At the extreme this causes
crashes, but the effect is seen at every time scale, producing a power law of price disturbances.
A standard (supposedly more sophisticated) risk control policy by individual banks makes these
extreme fluctuations even worse. Thus it is the very effort to control risk at the local level that
creates excessive risk at the aggregate level, which shows up as fat tails and clustered volatility.
JEL: E32, E37, G01, G12, G14
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Recent events in financial markets have underscored
the dangerous consequences of the use of excessive credit.
At the most basic level the problem is obvious: If a firm
buys assets with borrowed money, then under extreme
market conditions it may owe more money than it has
and default. If this happens on a sufficiently wide scale
then it can severely stress creditors and cause them to
fail as well.
We show here that a special but extremely widespread
kind of credit called collateralized loans with margin calls
has a more pervasive effect: when used excessively it can
cause default and crashes, but it also leaves a signature
even when there is no default or crash. These kinds of
loans have already been identified as a major culprit in
the recent crisis, and in previous near crises as well1. But
we show here that they create a dynamic in asset price
fluctuations that manifests itself at all time scales and to
all degrees. The extraordinary crisis of the last couple
years is just one extreme (but not extremal) point on a
continuum.
By taking out a collateralized loan a buyer of stocks
or mortgage backed securities can put together a portfo-
lio that is worth a multiple of the cash he has available
1 For previous equilibrium-based analyses of leverage, which show
that prices crash before default actually occurs, see Geanakoplos
[9, 13, 14, 15].
for their purchase. In 2006 this multiple or ”leverage”
reached 60 to 1 for AAA rated mortgage securities, and
16 to 1 for what are now called the toxic mortgage secu-
rities. The outstanding volume of these leveraged asset
purchases reached many trillions of dollars. Leverage has
fluctuated up and down in long cycles over the last 30
years.
Conventional credit is for a fixed amount and a fixed
maturity, extending over the period the borrower needs
the money. In a collateralized loan with margin calls, the
debt is guaranteed not by the reputation (or punishment)
of the borrower, but by an asset which is confiscated if
the loan is not repaid. Typically the loan maturity is very
short, say a day, much shorter than the length of time
the borrower anticipates needing the money. The con-
tract usually specifies that after the daily interest is paid,
as long as the loan to value ratio remains below a speci-
fied threshold, the debt is rolled over another day (up to
some final maturity, when the threshold ratio might be
changed). If, however, the collateral asset value falls, the
lender makes a margin call and the borrower is expected
to repay part of the debt and so roll over a smaller loan
to maintain the old loan to value threshold. Quite often
the borrower will obtain the cash for this extra downpay-
ment by selling some of the collateral. The nature of the
collateralized loan contract thus sometimes turns buyers
of the collateral into sellers, even when they might think
it is the best time to buy.
Needless to say, the higher the loan to value, or equiv-
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2alently, the higher the leverage ratio of asset value to
cash downpayment, the more severe will be the feedback
mechanism. A buyer who is at his threshold of λ times
leveraged loses λ% of his investment for every 1% drop in
the asset price, and on top of that will have to come up
with $(λ−1)/λ of new cash for every $1 drop in the price
of the asset. When there is no leverage, and λ = 1, there
is no feedback, but as the leverage increases, so does the
feedback.
The feedback from falling asset prices to margin calls
to the transformation of buyers into sellers back to falling
asset prices creates a nonlinear dynamic to the system.
The nonlinearity rises as the leverage rises. This non-
linear feedback would be present in the most sophisti-
cated rational expectations models or in the most simple
minded behavioral models: it is a mechanical effect that
stems directly from the nonlinear dynamics caused by the
use of leverage and margin calls. We therefore build the
simplest model possible and then simulate it over tens
of thousands of periods, measuring and quantifying the
effect of leverage on asset price fluctuations.
Our model provides a new explanation for the fat tails
and clustered volatility that are commonly observed in
price fluctuations [8, 19]. Clustered volatility and fat
tails emerge in the model on a broad range of time scales,
including very rapid ones and very slow ones. Mandel-
brot and Engle found that actual price fluctuations did
not display the independent and normally distributed
properties assumed by the pioneers of classical finance
(Bachelier and Black-Scholes). Though their work has
been properly celebrated, no consensus has formed on the
mechanism which creates fat tails and clustered volatility.
Common sense suggests there must be some endogenous
dynamic at work, since it is unlikely that information it-
self (which moves markets) is heavy tailed and clustered.
Previous endogenous explanations assume that mar-
ket traders are of at least two types: value investors,
who make investments based on fundamentals, and trend
followers, who make investments in the direction of re-
cent price movements2. Trend followers are inherently
destabilizing, and many would dispute whether such be-
havior is rational. Value investors, in contrast, are es-
sential to maintain a reasonably efficient market: They
gather information about valuations, and incorporate it
into prices. Thus in this sense value investing is ratio-
nal. In typical models of this type, investors move their
money back and forth between trend strategies and value
strategies, depending on who has recently been more suc-
cessful, and fat tails and clustered volatility are gener-
ated by temporary increases in destabilizing trend strate-
gies. The mechanism that we propose here for fat tails
and clustered volatility only involves value investors, who
leverage their investments by borrowing from a bank.
2 See [2, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 18, 20]. See also [10], who induce bubbles
and crashes via myopic learning dynamics.
Clustered volatility and fat tails emerge on a broad range
of time scales, including very rapid ones; our explanation
has the advantage that it can operate on such time scales
(whereas it is not obviously plausible that real agents
switch from value investing to trend following at rapid
speed).
An important aspect of our model is that even though
the risk control policies used by the individual bank
lenders are reasonable from a narrow, bank-centric point
of view, when a group of banks inadvertently acts to-
gether, they can dramatically affect prices, inducing non-
linear behavior at a systemic level that gives rise to exces-
sive volatility and even crashes. Attempts to regulate risk
without taking into account systemic effects can backfire,
accentuating risks or even creating new ones.3
In our model traders have a choice between owning a
single asset, such as a stock or a commodity, or owning
cash. There are two types of traders, noise traders and
funds. The noise traders buy and sell nearly at random,
with a slight bias that makes the price weakly mean-
revert around a perceived fundamental value V . The
funds use a strategy that exploits mispricings by taking a
long position (holding a net positive quantity of the asset)
when the price is below V , and otherwise staying out of
the market. The funds can augment the size of their
long position by borrowing from a bank at an interest
rate that for simplicity we fix at zero, using the asset as
collateral. This borrowing is called leverage. The bank
will of course be careful to limit its lending so that the
value of what is owed is less than the current price of the
assets held as collateral. Default occurs if the asset price
falls sufficiently far before the loan comes due in the next
period.
In addition to the two types of traders there is a rep-
resentative investor who either invests in a fund or holds
cash. The amount she invests in a given fund depends
on its recent historical performance relative to a bench-
mark return rb. Thus successful funds attract additional
capital above and beyond what they gain in the market
and similarly unsuccessful funds lose additional capital.
The funds in our model are value investors who base
their demand on a mispricing signal m(t) = V − p(t),
where p(t) is the price of the asset at time t. The per-
ceived fundamental value V is held constant and is the
same for the noise traders and for all funds. As shown in
Figure 1, each fund h computes its demand Dh(t) based
on the mispricing. As the mispricing increases, the dol-
lar value of the asset the fund wishes to hold increases
linearly, but the position size is capped when the fund
3 Another good example from the recent meltdown illustrating
how individual risk regulation can create systemic risk is the use
of derivatives.
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FIG. 1: Demand function Dh(t)p(t) of a fund (measured in
dollars) vs. the mispricing signal m(t) = V − p(t).
reaches the maximum leverage. This can be written:
m < 0 : Dh = 0 (1)
0 < m < mcrit : Dhp = βhmWh (2)
m ≥ mcrit : Dhp = λMAXh Wh. (3)
In (1) the asset is over-priced and the fund holds noth-
ing. In (2) the asset is underpriced but the mispric-
ing is not too large. The fund takes a position whose
monetary value is proportional to the mispricing m,
the fund’s wealth W , and the aggression parameter βh,
which can vary from fund to fund. In (3) the asset is
even more underpriced so that the fund has reached its
maximum leverage λh(t) = λMAXh . This occurs when
m ≥ mcrit = λMAXh /βh. The leverage λh is the ratio of
the dollar value of the fund’s asset holdings to its wealth,
i.e. λh(t) = Dhp/Wh = Dhp/(Dhp + Ct), where Ct is
cash. When the fund is borrowing money, Ct is negative
and represents the loan amount. The percent change in
wealth from a loss or gain in the asset price is λh times
the percent change in the value of the asset, hence the
name “leverage”. If λh = λMAXh > 1 and then in the next
period the price decreases, staying under the maximum
leverage will then require the fund to sell the asset. This
is called meeting a margin call.
At the beginning of the simulation the funds are all
given the same wealth W (0) = 2. Their wealth auto-
matically grows or shrinks according to the success or
failure of their trading. In addition it changes due to ad-
ditions or withdrawals of funds by investors. The size of
the addition or withdrawal is determined by the differ-
ence between a trailing exponential average of the fund’s
recent performance and the benchmark return rb. If a
fund’s wealth goes below a critical threshold, here set to
W (0)/10, the fund goes out of business4, and after a pe-
riod of time has passed it is replaced by a new fund with
4 Using a positive survival threshold for removing funds avoids the
wealth W (0) and the same parameters βh and λMAX.
If W (t) < 0 then the fund defaults. Prices are set by
equating the demand of the funds plus the noise traders
to the fixed supply of the asset. The details of the sim-
ulation and the fixed parameter values are given in the
Supplementary Material5.
The benchmark return rb plays an important role. If
the benchmark return is set very low then funds will be-
come very wealthy and will buy a large quantity of the
asset under even small mispricings, preventing the mis-
pricing from ever growing large. This effectively induces
a hard floor on prices. If the benchmark return is set
very high, funds accumulate little wealth and play a neg-
ligible role in price formation. The interesting behavior
is observed at intermediate values of rb where the funds’
demand is comparable to that of the noise traders.
In Fig. 2 we illustrate the wealth dynamics for a sim-
ulation with 10 funds whose aggression parameters are
βh = 5, 10, . . . , 50. They all begin with the same low
wealth W (0) = 2; at the outset they make good returns
and their wealth grows quickly. This is particularly true
for the most aggressive funds; with higher leverage they
make higher returns so long as the asset price is increas-
ing. As their wealth grows the funds have more impact,
i.e. they themselves affect prices, driving them up when
they are buying and down when they are selling. This
limits their profit-making opportunities and imposes a
ceiling of wealth at about W = 40. There is a series of
crashes which cause defaults, particularly for the most
highly leveraged funds. Twice during the simulation, at
around t = 10, 000 and 25, 000, crashes wipe out all but
the two least aggressive funds with βh = 5, 10. While
funds β3 − β10 wait to get reintroduced, fund β2 man-
ages to become dominant for extended periods of time.
The presence of the funds dramatically alters the sta-
tistical properties of price returns. This is illustrated in
Fig. 3, where we compare the distribution of logarithmic
price returns r(t) = log p(t)− log p(t−1), for three cases:
(1) Noise traders only. (2) Hedge funds with no leverage
(λMAX = 1). (3) Substantial leverage, i.e. λMAX = 10.
With only noise traders the log returns are (by construc-
tion) nearly normally distributed. When funds are added
without leverage the volatility of prices drops slightly,
but the log returns remain approximately normally dis-
tributed. When we increase leverage to λMAX = 10, how-
ever, the distribution becomes much more concentrated
in the center and the negative returns develop fat tails.
(Recall that since the funds are long-only, they are only
active when the asset is undervalued, i.e. when the mis-
pricing m > 0. This creates an asymmetry between pos-
itive and negative returns.) As shown in Fig. 3(b), for
λMAX = 10 the cumulative distribution for the largest
creation of “zombie funds” that persist for long periods of time
with almost no wealth.
5 The Supplementary Material can be found at
http://www.santafe.edu/∼jdf/SFI%20Template/PubsEconomics.html.
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FIG. 2: Wealth timeseries Wh(t) for 10 funds with βh = 5, 10, . . . , 50 and λ
max
h = 20 for all funds. Times at which (at least)
one fund collapses are marked by triangles.
negative returns roughly follows a straight line in a dou-
ble logarithmic scale, suggesting that it is reasonable to
approximate the tails of the distribution as a power law,
of the form P (r > R|m > 0) ∼ R−γ .
The exponent γ may be regarded as a measure of the
concentration of extreme risks. The transition from nor-
mality to fat tails occurs more or less continuously as
λMAX varies. This is in contrast to the conjecture of
Plerou et al.[11, 12, 22, 23] that γ has a universal value
γ ≈ 3. In Figure 3(c) we measure γ as a function of
λMAX. As λMAX increases γ decreases, corresponding to
heavier tails6. This trend continues until λMAX ≈ 10,
where γ reaches a floor at γ ≈ 2.5. A typical value mea-
sured for financial time series, such as American stocks
[7, 22], is γ ≈ 3. In our model this corresponds to a
maximum leverage λMAX ≈ 7.5. It is perhaps a coinci-
dence that 7.5 is the maximum leverage allowed for eq-
uity trading in the United States, but in any case this
demonstrates that the numbers produced by this model
are reasonable.
In Fig. 4 we show the log-returns r(t) as a function of
time. The case λMAX = 1 is essentially indistinguishable
from the pure noise trader case; there are no large fluctua-
tions and little temporal structure. The case λMAX = 10,
in contrast, shows large, temporally correlated fluctua-
tions. The autocorrelation function shown in panel (c) is
similar to that observed in real price series. This suggests
that this model may also explain clustered volatility [8].
The fat tails of price movements in our model are ex-
plained by the nonlinear positive feedback that occurs
when leverage hits its maximum value. When lever-
6 The value of γ when λ = 1 should be infinite, in contrast to the
measured value. Large values of γ are difficult to measure cor-
rectly, whereas small values are measured much more accurately.
age is below its maximum, funds damp volatility. In-
tuitively this is because they buy when the price falls,
opposing and therefore damping price movements. In
comparison to the volatility for noise traders alone, the
expected volatility E[r2t ] is damped by a factor approxi-
mately 1/(1 + βN (Ch +DhV )) < 1, where N is the total
number of shares of the asset. This is shown in the Sup-
plementary Material.
When funds reach their maximum leverage this re-
verses and funds instead amplify volatility. To remain
below λMAX the fund is forced to sell when the price
falls. The volatility in this case is amplified by a factor
approximately 1/(1 − λMAXN V ) > 1. This creates a pos-
itive feedback loop: Dropping prices cause funds to sell,
which causes a further drop in prices, which causes funds
to sell. This is clearly seen in Fig. 4(b), where we have
placed red triangles whenever at least one of the funds is
at its maximum leverage. All the largest negative price
changes occur when leverage is at a maximum. Thus we
see that the final cause of the extreme price movements
is the margin call, which funds can meet only by selling
and driving prices further down. Of course we are not
saying banks should not maintain leverage at a reason-
able level; we are only saying that if they all maintain
leverage at a similar level, many funds may make margin
calls at nearly the same time, inducing an instability in
prices.
In an attempt to achieve better risk control, banks of-
ten vary the maximum leverage based on the recent his-
torical volatility of the market, lowering maximum lever-
age when volatility is high and raising it when it is low.
This is prudent practice when lending to a single fund.
But as shown in Fig. 5 this can be counterproductive
when all the funds might be deleveraged at the same
time. The reason for this is simple: Lowering the maxi-
mum leverage across all funds can cause massive selling
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FIG. 3: The distribution of log returns r. (a) plots the density
of log returns p(r|m > 0) on semi-log scale. The results are
conditioned on positive mispricing, i.e. only when the funds
are active. The unleveraged case (red circles) closely matches
the noise trader only case (red curve). When the maximum
leverage is raised to ten (blue squares) the body of the dis-
tribution becomes thinner but the tails become heavy on the
negative side. This is seen from a different point of view in
(b), which plots the cumulative distribution for negative re-
turns, P (r > R|m > 0), in log-log scale. For λMAX = 10 we fit
a power law to the data across the indicated region and show
a line for comparison. In (c) we vary λMAX and plot fitted
values of γ, illustrating how the tails become heavier as the
leverage increases. We use the parameter settings described
in the Supplementary material with the same β values as in
Figure 1.
at just the wrong time, creating more defaults rather
than less. Once again, an attempt to improve risk con-
trol that is sensible if one bank does it for one fund can
backfire and create more risk if every bank does it with
every fund.
The use of leverage in the economy is not just an eso-
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FIG. 4: Log-return timeseries (a) λMAX = 1; (b) λMAX = 10.
Triangles mark margin calls in the simulation, indicating a di-
rect connection between large price moves and margin calls.
(c) Autocorrelation function of the absolute values of log-
returns for (a-b) obtained from a single run with 100, 000
timesteps. This is plotted on log-log scale in order to illus-
trate the power law tails. (The autocorrelation function is
computed only when the mispricing is positive.) Same β val-
ues as in Figure 1.
teric matter relating to funds: It is unavoidable. It is the
mechanism through which most people are able to own
homes and corporations do business. Credit (and thus
leverage) is built into the fabric of society. The current fi-
nancial crisis perfectly illustrate the dangers of too much
leverage followed by too little leverage. Like Goldilocks,
we are seeking a level that is “just right” [21].
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FIG. 5: Comparison of the default rate with constant maxi-
mum leverage (red circles) vs. adjustable leverage based on
recent historical volatility (blue squares). For details of how
leverage is adjusted see Supplementary Material. 10 funds
were considered with the same β values as in Figure 1.
We are not the first to recognize the downward spiral of
margin calls. After the Great Depression the Federal Re-
serve was empowered to regulate margins and leverage.
The model we have developed here provides a quantifi-
able framework to explore the consequences of leverage
and its regulation. Recent empirical work has found a
correlation betweeen leverage and volatility [1], but our
work suggests a more subtle relationship. We make the
falsifiable prediction that high leverage limits, such as we
had in reality until very recently, cause increased cluster-
ing of volatility and fat tails, and that these effects should
go up and down as leverage goes up and down. We have
shown that when individual lenders seek to control risk
through adjusting leverage, they may collectively amplify
risk. Our model can be used to search for a better collec-
tive solution, perhaps coordinated through government
regulation.
At a broader level, this work shows how attempts to
regulate risk at a local level can actually generate risks
at a systemic level. The key element that creates the risk
is the nonlinear feedack on prices that is created due to
repaying loans at a bad time. This mechanism is actually
quite general, and also comes into play with other risk
control mechanisms, such as stop-loss orders and many
types of derivatives, whenever they generate buying or
selling in the same direction as price movement. We sus-
pect that this is a quite general phenomenon, that occurs
in many types of systems whenever optimization for risk
reduction is done locally without fully taking collective
phenomena into account.
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